BlogLogic: “Christian Fundamentalist Terrorists” Outed?

June 1, 2009 6 Comments


It would happen at The Huffington Post. Contributor Shannyn Moore shocks the world today with her post warning us all about “Christian fundamentalist terrorists.” Her contention is that Jim D. Adkisson is a Christian fundamentalist terrorist. He’s the scurrilous individual who killed 2 people at the Tennessee Valley Unitarian Universalist Church as a result of firing 76 rounds and a shotgun.

Her complaint is that this Adkisson guy, who was charged with murder, “should have been charged with terrorism.” This suggests that she believes that terrorist acts are distinguishable from murder in general, that terrorist acts are in the category of worse or worst, and that perpetrators of such acts should be regarded and treated differently, i.e., more severely.

On the face of it, this is an odd thing for someone on the far left to say. Liberals on the far left are better known for rubbing out such distinctions. So it is initially heartening to see one of their own take up this cause.

It is disconcerting, on second thought, that this apparent shift is more likely an expression of the left’s characteristic animosity toward a certain brand of Christianity—the “fundamentalist” brand.

Moore thinks she’s making a sound argument for a definite position. But really she sounds angry, rather than calmly rational. In her post for today she spools out another specimen of BlogLogic. “BlogLogic” is the endearing term I use to denote digitally viral fallacious reasoning spread by bloggers and infecting unsuspecting readers who are ill-equipped to pick out the flaws.

The first problem with Moore’s argument is that her conclusion is too vague to be useful. She doesn’t define this term that she’s applying with such gusto to specific individuals: “Christian fundamentalist terrorist.” Maybe she thinks the meaning of her label is obvious—a Christian fundamentalist terrorist is a Christian fundamentalist who happens to be a terrorist; or maybe a Christian fundamentalist terrorist is a terrorist who happens to be a fundamentalist Christian.

It’s doubtful that this is quite what Moore means. She seems to be plugging for a stronger link between terrorism and Christian fundamentalism. Part of what makes this murderer, Adkisson, a terrorist is that he is a fundamentalist Christian. Otherwise, he would simply be a murderer. It’s as if he killed in the name of, or for the sake of, or out of commitment to Christian fundamentalism.

I’m not sure this is quite a strong enough link to satisfy Moore. Adkisson could be more of a nutcase than a Christian fundamentalist, and still kill in the name of, or for the sake of, or even out of (fanciful) commitment to Christian fundamentalism.

It seems, then, that Shannyn Moore deliberately employs the phrase “Christian fundamentalism” in connection with terrorism in order to shame Christian fundamentalists. And this, it has to be said, is itself shameful. Moore is simply poisoning the well against a block of conservative Christians who do not, as a group, sanction the heinous crimes of Adkisson and others. If she thinks there is something inherent in the belief system of people broadly considered Christian fundamentalists that incites the exceptional and incalculably immoral behavior of persons such as Adkisson, then she needs to demonstrate that with evidence. She, of course, cannot.

So Moore’s conclusion is vague because her use of the phrase “Christian fundamentalist terrorist” is vague—or not. If not, then her reasoning is specious and onerous, because it is maliciously ad hominem.

There are more problems with Moore’s thesis. She does not say precisely what distinguishes an act of terror from any other murderous act. There’s also a confusion in her understanding, both of the law and of ordinary application of the concept of terrorism. Clearly she believes that Adkisson should be tried as a terrorist. But one need not commit a murder to perform an act of terrorism. There are terrorists who do not commit murder, nor even conspire to commit murder. And whether or not Adkisson’s action was a form of terrorism, it was an act of murder. He can and should be tried for murder; he almost certainly will be found guilty.

Moore isn’t satisfied with the charges. They don’t go far enough. Why? Surely things wouldn’t be any worse for Adkisson if he was tried for terrorism rather than murder. So how does Moore calculate that more would be accomplished, as she seems to think? Well, for starters, it would stigmatize a large segment of the Amerian population. It would place them under suspicion. Is that really what Moore wants?

Shannyn Moore seems to confuse hate crimes with terrorism. She should consider the difference. Terrorism, as that concept is applied most broadly today, constitutes a threat to national security. Terrorist acts may be motivated by hatred, but they are not merely “hate crimes.” They usually involve conspirators whose ideology entails a denunciation of all other ideologies, and violent action against those ideologies.

Use of the term “terrorist” has evolved considerably since 9/11. Shannyn Moore would like to see the concept stretched even more broadly to encompass those she calls “Christian fundamentalist terrorists.” If she wants to make her case rsponsibly, she’ll need to tidy up her definitions of key terms, locate incentives to perform acts of terrorism within an ideology that can justly be called “Christian fundamentalism,” demonstrate that Adkisson and similar characters are appropriately affiliated with Christian fundamentalists and not lunatics who can call themselves whatever they want, and establish her generalizations on the basis of a sufficient (i.e., far greater, number of cases).

Meanwhile, she should cease and desist her use of the phrase “Christian fundamentalist” in connection with terrorism. And, consistent with the culture of the left, it seems reasonable to ask that she apologize to Christian fundamentalists nationwide for carelessness in her use of this phrase.

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Note to Shannyn Moore: I’ve linked this post to the comment section of your post with a trackback. If I’ve misrepresented your position, or you wish to add the clarification that I claim is needed for your argument to work, I welcome your response.

Filed under BlogLogic, Christianity, Culture War, Religion Tagged with , , , , , , , ,

Faith-Based Initiatives and Religious Pluralism

July 2, 2008 Leave a comment


Government support for “faith-based initiatives” has been one of the most visible of George W. Bush’s initiatives during his two-term presidency.

This program was welcomed by many religious believers, especially Christians and most especially socially conservative Christians. Many of these Christians have been theologically conservative, as well. One implication of this is that many Christians in favor of faith-based initiatives object to religious pluralism.

Because so much support for faith-based initiatives comes from socially and theologically conservative Christians, some opponents of Bush’s policy have directed one particular argument against this constituency. They have argued that—under the government program—nonChristian institutions of faith must be allowed equal opportunity to participate in the program. They have then assumed that Christian entities in support of the policy would object to nonChristian participation. This would mean one that Christian supporters of the Bush policy have a double standard, one for themselves and another for nonChristian entities. And this is both offensive and non-viable in a socially and politically pluralistic environment such as we have in the United States. The alternative is for Christian groups to withhold support for faith-based initiatives. Without their support, one might imagine, the policy would die on the vine.

What should we make of this argument?

First, we must distinguish between religious pluralism, in the theological sense, and social and political pluralism. In the Christian theological tradition, “religious pluralism” is a term for broad approval of the view that salvation is available in the context of a variety of religions, rather than through Christ alone. Opposition to this kind of religious pluralism is compatible with acceptance of social and political pluralism; it’s even compatible with the sort of social and political toleration that is considered such a virtue.

In a modern democracy, there are bound to be many different kinds of religious communities, members of which have equal entitlement to participation in government arrangements. All have the same rights, freedoms and responsibilities. Christian advocates of faith-based initiatives are free to support nonChristian institutional participation in faith-based initiatives.

In fact, one expression of Christian charity would be to welcome the aid of nonChristian groups in the effort to assist members of society most in need of assistance.

We come to the second point. The objection to Christian support for faith-based initiatives, outlined above, may prove too much. It assumes that, apart from support by Christian conservatives, the faith-based Bush plan would lose traction. Let’s assume this is true. Why would that be?

I’m sure the answer is complicated. But part of the answer may have to do with how Christian institutions, among faith-based organizations, provide assistance to those in need. It may happen that a significant majority of faith-based assistance work is handled by Christian organizations. There are, after all, many more Christians in the United States than there are members of other faiths or secularists. But it would be of much more interest to learn about any differences there might be between Christian and nonChristian programs of assistance, in terms of theological motivation, organizational infrastructure, efficiency, lay participation, and so forth.

Christianity stresses “good Samaritan” behavior. It would be interesting to compare nonChristian faiths, and also secularism, on this point. Of course, organized groups of secularists are not faith-based entities, in the traditional sense. So, though they might support faith-based initiatives, in the interests of assisting by all means those in need, they would not qualify for participation in faith-based initiatives. At any rate, non-sectarian societies that exist to help others have long been supported in various ways with government aid.

We should recall another feature of the “good Samaritan” practice within Christianity. In his parable of the good Samaritan, Jesus instructed his audience to provide self-sacrificing assistance to those in need, even when those in need are not members of one’s own community—including one’s own community of faith. This perhaps explains why so many institutions (for example, hospitals and world relief organizations) have been the legacy of Christian social activism.

Studying the ways in which, and even the extent to which, different religious faiths conceive of their role in assisting the needy could contribute mightily to inter-faith understanding. It could also provide useful perspective for evaluating the objection to faith-based initiatives described above. Are Christian organizations the primary vehicles for the distribution of faith-based aid? If so, we might look to the social practices of nonChristian faith groups for a deep explanation.

Filed under Politics, Religion Tagged with , , , , , ,

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